Jairo Ferreira 210 despite the differences). These differences refer to the epistemological origins of the concept in Bourdieu (Weber, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty). In the notion of habitus, Bourdieu also ap- propriated Aristotle’s concept of hexis: The hexis is a habitual state (mainly of the body) acquired by the repetition of acts in accordance with reason, repetition that forms habits. This ha- bitual state directs the action as a whole; whoever disposes of it has an assured sense of what is due or what has to be done. The habitus, thus, is, at the same time, a way of being, a disposition or a propensity, and a generative power. These are dimen- sions that Bourdieu kept and, in turn, modified (QUERÉ, 2017, page 3). This fragment – which reminds us well of passages from Goffmann’s work (2011) - has a central importance in Bourdieu’s work, not sufficiently problematized, which locates his criticism of Saussure, not only directed to the understanding of speech as an ‘application’ of linguistics and communication systems (we will return to this second aspect) but also to the understanding of the sign not only as linguistics understood it. After all, hexis refers to the relationship between what he called linguistic habitus and bodily hexis (BOURDIEU, 1996, p. 69). This manifestation of the habitus in dispositions brings him closer to Peirce in that: Knowing a language, for example, is a disposition, that is, a permanent potentiality, which is updated from time to time, on specific occasions, and that may never even be actualized; it is no less real for this, because, according to Peirce, universals (laws, habits, significations) are real, in the sense that they really operate in nature. We know that Peirce also conceived beliefs as habits of action, that is, as dispositions to act in such and such a way and circumstances (CHAUVIRÉ, 2002, p. 28, apud QUERÉ, 2017, p. 2).
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