Mediatization, post-truth, and knowledge production about Covid-19 251 truth. This regime of truth is given primarily by the accumulated idea of “I was there” to “I experienced what I say.” Experience also suggests the idea of personally gathered knowledge. There- fore, it imposes a character of subjectivity but not necessary for dialogue or intersubjectivity. In place of accumulated and com- municated knowledge, there is a greater contemporary appre- ciation of accumulated and communicated experience. As stated elsewhere, this reconfiguration of the truth, from facts verifiable through the scientific method to the pri- macy of sensible certainty given through the singular experience (SACRAMENTO, 2018), makes the testimony of the narrator’s experience paired and, in determined cases, equivalent to the truth since that, as a witness, victim of survivor, whoever narrates what one lived has, in the social routine, authority, and le- gitimacy conferred on oneself. After all, the narrator becomes “worthy of faith and trust for having lived what he narrates” (RIBEIRO; SACRAMENTO, 2020, p. 11)5. While the roots of this epistemic crisis are visible, for example, in the anti-vaccine movement and climate change denial, COVID-19 may be our first pandemic of the era of what has often been named post-truth. Less than a concept, such a notion points out to a phenomenon of crisis of institutionality, legitimacy, and recognition of truth as a fundamental attribute 5 The Phenomenology of Spirit begins with the well-known figure of sensible certainty. But what is this sensible certainty? The knowledge that is first or immediately our object cannot be anything other than which is, in itself, immedi- ate knowledge, knowledge of the immediate, or the being. Sensitive certainty is, therefore, immediate knowledge; better still, it is to know the immediacy of the immediacy per se, i.e., of the pure being. Sensitive certainty is knowing the immediate being of the thing that it knows. It knows what the chair you are sit- ting on is and that this is the first and last truth; he knows that the stars above his head exist, and immediately they exist, i.e., they are, whether anyone knows it or not. In short, sensitive certainty knows the thing as a being immediate, apart from the gaze of consciousness which affirms this truth of immediate being. And not only the thing known and intended is said to be immediate, but the “I” that knows the immediate being of the thing is immediate, that is, a singular I abstracted from everything. And, finally, sensitive certainty itself, as a relation between the “I” and the immediate being, is also said to be immediate. Appar- ently, it is from the philosopher’s point of view - the point of view of the “for us” in the Fenomenologia do Espírito - and not from the sensitive certainty itself. In fact, how could sensible certainty admit the co-mediation of the I and the thing, since, for it, everything is immediate? All the more so because then there seems to be a profound contradiction: and the thing and I would be immediately relating each other and mediated by the other.
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