Igor Sacramento 252 of science and journalism, for instance. Strongly marked by online social media, the possibility of sharing personal opinions, meeting, and bonding with peers, and closing in on community circuits marked by belief, trust, personal nature, and dogmas under the guise of freedom of expression (cf. SACRAMENTOS; PAIVA, 2020), we are still discussing significant changes in the contemporary regime of truth in which testimony, experience, and the right to freedom of expression are seen as fundamental in gauging what is true. In a determined contemporary epistemological regime marked by the notion and practice of post-truth, the producer of knowledge is not necessarily the scientist who establishes a relationship of methodological distance with the object, rather the witness who acquires authority by experiencing reality with his own body or observing the experience of others: “[…] an authority that, ultimately, rests on the double presence of the body: there, in the original scene of the events, and here, at the moment of the narrative” (OLIVEIRA, 2020, p. 82). In this sense, what interests us here is the place of testimony in the definition of truth in its relation to politics. To what extent does affiliation to a far-right political project, such as a system of shared beliefs, make doctors abandon objective truth (of facts verified by science) in favor of stating a testimony about the clinical experi- ence? What are the arguments used to establish personal clini- cal experience, so that the practice of evidence-based medicine can be disregarded? Or more: how do they turn their own expe- riences and opinions into evidence - as Bolsonaro does? In a contemporary context, there is a testimonial ethos that aims to empower public speeches to the status of true by narrating a personal experience: the referent of the narrated re- ality is the very experience of past events experienced by the narrator (SACRAMENTO; BORGES, 2017). If the ethos designates a discursive procedure for producing trust in what is enunciated by the constructed image of the speaker in and by the enunciative situation, in this context, what we see is that the legitima- tion of the enunciators’ trust relies on the experience itself: it is referenced by the personal experience as public speaking. The enunciator lives what he talks about: he is the narrator, source, and referent of the account of his experience. The experiential
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