Igor Sacramento 258 presented (or represented) by the proponent in order to prove himself worthy of the trust of his audience” (ibid., 2009, p. 70). This trust is placed based on the credentials that the proponent of a thesis gathers. In many cases, this trust can be anchored in the presumed institutional representation of the enunciator, in the previous or pre-discursive ethos (acting as a doctor, as president of the Republic, as a teacher and so on), but it can also be based on the representation that is it builds in the discourse itself – the discursive ethos or said ethos. This difference does not mean that the previous ethos is not discursive but that the first is in the or- der of a given discourse, of an already known credential, which is recognized at the moment of the interlocution. Discursive ethos, on the other hand, is made in the statement in action in a given communication situation. According to Dominique Maingueneau (2008, p. 270), “the effective ethos results from an interaction between several factors: the pre-discursive ethos, the discursive ethos (shown in the discourse), but also the fragments of the text in which the enunciator evokes his enunciation itself – said ethos.” From this perspective, Dittrich (2009, p. 67) recalls that “the au- thority argument does not seem to encompass all the complexity of this universe of presentations and representations” of the cre- dentialing arguments. The credentials that make an enunciator worthy of trust are mobilized to value the enunciator not only in relation to the enunciator’s cultural and scientific capital, but also in relation to everything that does not harm the values considered fundamental for the enunciatee. We consider it necessary to include a new form of ethi- cal argumentation: experiential arguments. Experience, beyond the evidence, has assumed, in our society, a privileged place in recognizing the value of truth. Under the weight of the impor- tance given to identity policies and the notion of the place of speech, but previously to testimony as an index of truth (SARLO, 2005) or as the presented truth (OLIVEIRA, 2020), now we, as a society, seem happy to take seriously the statements that “I can have my truth” and “you can have yours” (FUKUYAMA, 2018). In my words, I understand that this epistemology from the point of view and the implied diffusion of the notion of lived experi- ence presents the truth as something that is only subjective (my truth, your truth) or intersubjective (our truth), but never “the”
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