Mediatization, polarization, and intolerance (between environments, media, and circulation)

Luís Mauro Sá Martino 40 pus for his closest students, leaving the Dialogues that came to us to a broader audience. On the other hand, Aristotle seems to have written dialogues as refined as those of his teacher, Plato. Aristotelian texts that have survived to this day seem, mainly, to be notes from classes taken by his students or, at best, drafts of his course A s p . parently, the Greek notion of tekhné referred to an ability to do something, to create something - and, in that, there was a process, both mental and manual, something that Latin would translate as ars , from which derive, at the same time, “art” and “crafts.” Tekhné referred not only to an ability to do something, but it was also linked to the mental dispositions for that, a hexis - a “mental habit” from which the “technician” could carry out his work. Part of the medieval philosophy translat- ed hexis into habitus , leaving an implicit mind-body relationship, linked from the notion of a generating capacity not only to prac- tical actions but also to the ideas necessary to give them shape - which Bourdieu (1983) takes up as one of its main concepts. Thus, talking about “technique” was not just talking about a practical operational capacity related to a given action, but the potential to transform a “concept”, an “idea,” or “form” ( eidos ) into something physical, concrete. The Tekhné made this transition, becoming a strained notion between “concept” and “practice” I . f we consider this conception, speaking of “technique” as something separate from the human being who uses it, there seems to be a contradiction: technique, in this point of view, is not an attribute of the dispositif used to accomplish something, but inherent to the human - the opposite of that would be like saying that the carpenter’s “technique” is in the chisel, not in its operator. “Technology,” in this sense, can be considered in terms of something external to the being - which, in any case, devel- oped it, but this does not happen with the human technique. It is in a similar sense that Heidegger seems to work with the topic in his lecture on technique: technique is not, in itself, a “technique”, but it is part of the human. The pharmakón is a constituent and constitutive of the human. If pharmakón is widespread, what about teaching? To what extent can the epistéme be influenced by the pharmakón of