Mediatization, polarization, and intolerance (between environments, media, and circulation)

Tiago Quiroga 60 of both the “scientification of everyday life” and the simulation of the future as important vectors of restructuring the field of work, they remain glued to the enunciative logic of real time. However, through programming regimes, what is paradoxically atrophied is the epistemological capacity for self-determination in the present time. Linked to speed, such practices fix the expe - rience of time to the sign of availability (HAN, 2014b), and, with this, they have difficulty collecting historical inflections that support new interpretative keys. Considered as one of the principal philosophers of the 19th century, Hegel (1770-1831), in The Science of Logic (HEGEL, 2012), states that the transformation of history is the result of the permanent strain between what is and is not . Al- though apparently separated by the dialectical movement, they experience a unity, which, in reality, has always existed, even though in the field of appearances they seem separate. In the strain between Being and Nothingness , “each one disappears in its opposite,” this being the very becoming of history (CHÂTE- LET, 1985, p. 52). Now, based on the constitutive value of speed, the logics of real time no longer tolerate the presence of any- thing other than their intensification. Thus, they not only detach themselves from any experience of duration, necessarily sup- ported by the dialectical strain I-other, positive-negative, but, above all, they end up not recognizing, in the temporality imma- nent to the historical becoming itself, a space of inference and construction of prospective keys. Otherwise, they are now linked to hyper-realism which, “more real than reality” (HAN, 2018, p. 111), no longer requires so much discernment, but adherence to its overwhelming sensorialism. Circumscribed to the temporal- ity of the equal (HAN, 2014), there is, then, the current historical figure of the spectral subject that, according to Agamben (2009), results from the occasion when the “subjectivization and de- subjectivization processes [...] seem to become reciprocally indifferent” (2009, p. 47). A subject who lives on simply addic- tive time (HAN, 2014b) and confines temporalities to a “painful and desperate” presentism (HARTOG, 2019, p. 148). According to Hartog (2019), characterized by the vertigo of the cloistering of the present time to the ephemeral regime, the new historical regime - presentism - comes from the 1970s and accounts for